Burmese Demonstrations Undermine Regime Legitimacy

Burma has been in the news quite a bit lately regarding ongoing human rights issues and the recent suppression of demonstrations. I thought it would be pertinent to post some background about the recent issues for people that are lesser informed, but still very interested in the topic. The following is a brief summary of the issues as I understand them.

In 1988, Burma’s ruling party agreed to hold democratic elections in the country. At the time the party believed it would win the popular vote and an election would further legitimate its continued rule of the government. Unfortunately for the ruling party, however, it did not win and ultimately refused to turnover power. When widespread demonstrations erupted in protest to the government’s decision, the military stepped in and established a junta regime.

In theory the regime has been working towards political reforms that will eventual allow for democratic rule, but in practice real change has been slow. The justification used internationally for the military junta's rule is that the country currently has no constitutional mechanism that would allow for a democratically elected party to rule. Although this reason hypothetically accepts that Burma only requires the creation of constitution that would allow for democratic turnover, in actually the regime has at best dragged its feet on commitments to create such a document. In its current stage, the ruling party has been allegedly working with foreign leaders to establish a draft set of ‘guiding principles’ that will inform the process of drafting of a new constitution, but this process has yielded few substantive results.

To date, the military junta has continued to rule the country with mixed success. On the surface, the military has maintained control over both the country and the people even while real support for the regime seems to be eroding. Exemplifying the types of controls the government relies is the house arrest of democratic opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi since 1989. Additionally, the importance of the military to many families as a social network for securing necessary commodities such as rice and oil enhances the grip of the junta. In combination with political suppression and widespread poverty, citizens lack the political and economic capacity to mount an effective challenge to the regime (listen to an interview by an expert on Burma studies here).

Yet the core issues that legitimate the regime's monopoly of force appear to be eroding. Burma expert and Dean of Social Sciences, Professor Ian Holliday, explains that poor economic planning mixed with recent acts of repression, and violence against Buddhist monks in particular, fundamentally challenge the regime’s claim to legitimacy (listen here).

Whether this will ultimately challenge the junta’s grip on power remains to be seen. Currently, on the surface most things seemed to have calmed and it is “business as usual” in Burma. Still, there are reasons to suspect this is only superficial. Recent acts of political dissent by smaller groups appear to be growing. The posting of wall posters and other isolated acts of opposition (www.mizzima.com) have not led to a coordinated effort as occurred in 1988, but it does suggest something. It could be that restriction on internet use (as well as its sluggish pace) and other communication makes cooperation difficult. It may also be that for now the government is effective in its policing. Yet the regime may be giving ground.

According to a statement today (10 November) by the democratic opposition party, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi may be released soon (www.mizzima.com). This follows an agreement to allow a UN special envoy’s visit to Burma and an exchange between democratic opposition leader and the UN representative. It also follows an understanding made between the democratic leader and the junta regime to cooperate on dialogue.

It is possible that recent moves are only symbolic gestures by the military junta in Burma. Nevertheless, this appears to be more than has happened in the past. No doubt international pressures played a decisive role in this outcome. Whether real substantive political change will occur as a result remains to be seen.

Written by Dan (East Asia Focus)

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In early October I conducted an interview as part of a University of Hong Kong program ("Global Passport") with the Dean of Social Sciences at the university, Ian Holliday. Professor Holliday is an expert in Burma studies and you can listen to the interview online here.

You may also find helpful information regarding Burma news at www.mizzima.com.

Water Pollution in China

Following up on the green GDP post from a few weeks ago, a few recent articles highlight both the severity of China's environmental problems, and the government's growing efforts to address those woes. Despite the indefinite suspension of the 2005 green GDP this past July, it appears that Chinese officials are not deviating from their broader mission to tackle pollution and the serious health risks it presents.

Chinese state media reported this week that water pollution in China currently threatens the health and safety of one sixth of the population (see Reuters article). River water in many parts of China is unfit to touch, let alone drink. This not only directly threatens the diets and health of many Chinese but also compromises the food supply in how it affects the fish population and the irrigation of crops. Such water conditions become especially dire when considering that many parts of China suffer from a shortage of water to begin with.


Rapid economic development, corruption, poor pollution laws, and lax enforcement of those laws, all have contributed to the current state of the environment in China today. Water pollution is a major component of that. For example, a state study of Zhukou city in Henan province found that 15 of 23 factories were illegally dumping waste into the water supply (see Reuters article). Part of the problem is factory owners neglecting pollution regulations and local officials turning a blind eye, but another part of the problem is insufficient restrictions and weak enforcement mechanisms for violators. Chairman of the National People's Congress's (NPC) Environment and Resource Protection Committee, Mao Rubai, recently remarked that pollution standards for some industries are too low to make a dent in China's battle against environmental degradation (see Reuters article).

Over the weekend, officials (from SEPA, I believe) made a step to change this sour state of affairs. They put forward a draft amendment to the Standing Committee of the NPC to amend the water pollution prevention and control law to incorporate harsher penalties for pollution violators and better monitor and enforce pollution regulations. Major clauses of the bill include:

• Lifting the existing pollution penalty cap of 1 million RMB and replacing it with 20% to 30% of the cost of the pollution


• People responsible for major accidents will be susceptible to prosecution


• Introducing a licensing system for emitters of waste water containing toxic or radioactive materials; No license, no pollution


• Placing extra emphasis on protecting drinking water sources


• Strengthening emergency response system for water pollution accidents (see article)

The proposed amendment comes just weeks after SEPA announced that 30 firms would be blacklisted for gross pollution violations, barring them from receiving bank loans (see BBC article).

A change in political culture appears poised to accompany this apparent legal offensive against illegal polluters, a logical compliment considering how lax or corrupt political enforcement at the local level enables industrial polluters. Ma Kai, chief of the National Resource and Development Commission (NRDC), recently revealed that "meeting energy and pollution reduction targets would be made a major factor in considering promotions for provincial-level officials," (see Reuters article).

While these steps strike me as the right way to approach the issue, it remains to be seen if they will produce results. China's struggle against environmental pollution in recent years has been little more than just that - a struggle. The country failed to reach the 2006 benchmarks for pollution reduction and energy consumption per unit GDP as put forth in the most recent five-year plan (see IHT article), (Beijing's 11th Five Year Plan aims to reduce energy consumption per unit GDP by 20% between 2006 and 2010 and lower major pollution output by 10% in that same period). In fact, pollution...at least water pollution...was on the rise in 2006, with the chemical oxygen demand, a water pollution index, rising by 0.24% in 2006.

It is hard for me to gauge to what extent national laws, blacklists, and the prospect of political promotion have played a role, or failed to play a role, in the counter-pollution effort. Thus, it is even harder to gauge how those factors will play a role in turning the tide in the fight against pollution. On paper, it certainly helps to redefine regulation and introduce political penalties to local officials, in addition to fiscal and legal consequences for polluters. In reality however, the prevalence of lower-level government corruption, the dominance of a profit-first economic culture, and obvious institutional deficiencies in the anti-pollution regime, suggest that these measures may not be as impactful as they should be. Perhaps, as Hu Jintao consolidates his power, and the anti-corruption, anti-pollution, pro-harmony generation leaves its mark on China's future development, these obstacles will erode away. Until then, China has a lot more to clean up than just river beds.

Japan, ASEAN Reach Free Trade Agreement

Japan and ASEAN have agreed in principle to the establishment of a free trade zone between the two parties. Representatives from both sides came to a consensus on an outline for the agreement at a three-day ASEAN economic conference in Manila. The deal is expected to be finalized at the upcoming ASEAN summit meeting this November (Voice of America).

The FTA with Japan is one of many on ASEAN's plate at the moment. It is currently also pursuing FTAs with China, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand, and is exploring the potential for an FTA with Pakistan (Forbes). The FTA with China, like the one with Japan, is expected to be completed by the end of this year. The other agreements are all in more preliminary phases. ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong expects that all five agreements (excl. Pakistan) will be completed by 2013 (Forbes).

ASEAN's FTA offensive is part of a broader ASEAN strategy to build an Asian Economic Community (AEC) by 2015, a strong Southeast Asian economic bloc capable of running with economic giants like China and India into the 21st century (Voice of America). As Asia continues to grow economically and China and India continue to acquire political influence, ASEAN continues to look for ways to compete economically and remain relevant. By casting a wide net into regional trade waters, ASEAN diversifies its economic portfolio and expands its prospects for growth. It also helps balance external political influence on the Southeast Asian bloc.

The ASEAN-Japan FTA is the latest step in this process. The agreement hopes to expand on already strong trade and investment relationships with Japan. Japan accounted for 12% of ASEAN's trade in 2006 (BBC News), and as of around 2003-2004, unless I am mistaken, Japan was ASEAN's largest source of investment (Lincoln, East Asian Economic Regionalism). The agreement also helps ASEAN balance the influence of China.

For Japan, free trade agreements with Southeast Asia have become common practice. It has already concluded 6 bilateral FTAs with Southeast Asian states, including one just last week with Indonesia (The Economic Intelligence Unit Briefing). Expanding economic relations with the region provides Japan with access to energy resources - the deal with Indonesia, for example, features a comprehensive resource acquisition/investment agreement. It also allows Japan to diversify away from its economic reliance on the United States, and balance against the regional influence of China. This multilateral agreement with ASEAN compliments the previous bilateral trade pacts and contributes to all three of Japan's regional goals.

Analysts are skeptical however that this FTA, or any other regional FTA on ASEAN's plate, can yield concrete results. Southeast Asia lacks infrastructure and suffers from poor product standards that contribute to an overall unappealing climate for foreign investment (Voice of America). Furthermore, the ever-present issue of agricultural in Asia-based trade deals means that any substantive gains from an FTA could be years, if not decades, away.

Personally, I will be greatly surprised if these FTAs can actually materialize into an Asian economic bloc, as ASEAN seems to be envisioning with the AEC. The economic obstacles, political obstacles and competing interests in the region seem too great to overcome in just a decade. Nonetheless, last week's economic conference marked an important step in the right direction, and I suppose November's summit meeting will yield more clues as to the fate of the would-be Asian economic bloc. Keep an eye out.

The Problems with Beijing's Involvement in Chinese Energy Investments

Sorry for the China-heavy contributions. I do have other interests, I promise. This policy brief from the Brookings Institute, "Untangling China's Quest for Oil through State-backed Financials Deals," deals with one of my primary interests though, and I thought anyone else interested in China's energy security strategy would want to give it a read.

The Brookings brief looks more closely at the impact of China's state-financing and foreign aid practices in its energy policy, and suggests that if Beijing's practices do not change, and China remains on the outside looking in at international finance/investment regimes, the heavy state involvement in energy investment deals could eventually undermine open, competitive international energy markets, and in turn international energy security, as well as international aid.

The brief concludes that China should be incorporated into more international forums that can regulate financial interactions and energy practices, like the IEA and the OECD Export Credit Arrangement. These groupings will not only hold China to legal standards and test Beijing's merit as a "responsible stakeholder" in the international system, but also expand dialogue and build trust among parties so that Beijing does not feel compelled to continue financial practices that can undermine competitive international energy markets or international aid.

For more on this subject, I suggest this NBR study from 2006, and this 2006 Brookings report on China's Energy Security Strategy.

These reports all discuss the implications of China's energy policy for the United States, but I'd be curious to hear if anyone has any insights, ideas, or links that deal with how other actors (India, Northeast Asian states, etc.) view China's energy policy and practices.

Red Light for China's Green GDP Report

Last month, Beijing announced that it was indefinitely suspending the release of its 2005 "green GDP" report, a study designed to calculate the environmental costs of China's economic development. The announcement has generated considerable speculation and reveals much about both the growing burden of China's environmental woes on the decision-makers in Beijing, and the complexities of Chinese domestic politics.

Originally scheduled for release in March, 2007 (Reuters), the officially titled Environmentally Adjusted GDP Accounting Report for 2005 was slated to be the more thorough, more detailed follow-up to a 2004 report of the same nature, and a major notch in the belt of China's emerging environmental policy.

Growing social unrest over horrendous and harmful environmental problems at home, as well as the increased international consciousness of global climate change, have elevated environmentalism to a political priority in China. Last fall, the National People's Congress set forth ambitious goals to improve energy efficiency, reduce consumption, and fight pollution (China Brief, Vol. VII, Issue 16). From my own observations, since that time, China has also begun listing environmental concerns and global warming among its common interests with regional neighbors and international powers. Calculating "green GDP" is part of a broad approach that attempts to inject a sense of environmental responsibility into China's economically-minded, "development first" political culture.

China launched its "green GDP" project in 2003-2004, jointly administered by the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The first product of the endeavor, the 2004 report, was released in 2006. Assessing the scale of environmental pollution in 10 provinces, the report found that pollution cost China over $67 billion US dollars, 3 percent of its GDP, in 2004 (Worldwatch).

The 2005 report was national in scope, and measured the country's "green GDP" according to seven different criteria, including environmental pollution. The other criteria included depletion costs of mines, forests, land, water, and wildlife, as well as costs to the ecosystem (China Brief). The 2005 report also provides a provincial breakdown in each category, creating a "green GDP" report at the provincial as well as national level.

Obviously, given the increased scope of the study and the expanded criteria, not to mention China's continued struggle to rein in its energy appetite, the 2005 report promised to deliver more disturbing statistics than its predecessor. This alone would be enough to make already-antsy officials in Beijing reluctant to release the results of the report for fear of generating further social unrest, especially with the 17th Party Congress around the corner in the fall. Furthermore, the localization of blame (at the provincial level) for the country's environmental problems introduces additional opponents to the report into the picture (provincial and local officials). According to Wenran Jiang, in some provinces, the cost of pollution, resource depletion, and damage to the ecosystem would actually cancel out the economic gains of the province's GDP for the year (China Brief).

Chinese officials appear divided over the report and divisions, at least publicly, seem to adhere to the old adage about Chinese politics, "Where you sit is where you stand." Officials with the NBS claim that the report's release has been indefinitely suspended due to conflicts over the scientific accuracy of the statistics and technical issues pertaining to publication (Worldwatch). Indeed this is true. As NBS Chief Xie Fuzhan (pictured left) recently told reporters, China is essentially pioneering the creation of a "green GDP" index and the use of "green GDP" to measure and confront environmental degradation (Asia Times). No international standards exist for such a project. According to the 2003 UN Handbook on National Accounting, "there is no consensus on how 'green GDP' can be calculated and, in fact, still less consensus on whether it should be attempted at all." How to quantify environmental elements in terms of monetary value remains an extremely challenging and uncertain task. (Note: this article from Resources for the Future attempts to bridge the gap between environmentalism and economics)

Officials in SEPA meanwhile, and other environmental agencies, remain more loyal to the cause of 'green GDP' and are more candid when discussing the motivations behind suspending the report's release. Wang Jinnan from the Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning (CAEP) recently revealed, "There exist major differences between the environmental-protection agency and the statistical bureau regarding the content of the report and its distribution," (Asia Times). As he told Beijing News:

"In the current sensitive climate where everybody is talking about 'green change,' some provinces fear publicizing their revised [green] GDP figures...Some local governments have lobbied us and tried to put pressure on us not to make the report public."

SEPA, CAEP, and Chinese environmentalists support the report's release, despite technical difficulties and political opposition. The NBS sees things differently. This gap in perspective has put the 2005 report on the shelf until further notice.

But while the 2005 report may not be made public, the importance of addressing China's worsening environmental woes will not fade away so easily for the Chinese government or the Chinese people. China is, and will continue to be, one of the most polluted countries in the world until it takes some drastic steps to address its pollution problems and curb its consumption of energy and natural resources. The launching of the "green GDP" project a few years ago seemed like a new and exciting step in the right direction: an active, ambitious, and creative approach to a demanding challenge. The tie-up over the 2005 "green GDP" report suggests that the more things change, the more they stay the same. In China, "face" and positive financial statistics remain more important than results.

On a positive note however, the concept of "green GDP" is not dead, nor is environmentalism in China. The 2006 report, perhaps in hopes that it will yield more positive results, and perhaps because its release will not precede any high profile political conferences, is still going ahead as planned (China Daily). Outside observers may be helpless to remove political obstacles to the development of China's "green GDP," but international actors and non-government actors can still play a major role in tackling the technical challenges of the index, and more importantly the environmental problems the index aims to address.

Recommendation: China Road

I figure I'd reacquaint myself with the blog with a simple contribution: a reading recommendation.

I just finished reading China Road, by NPR correspondent, Rob Gifford. Gifford spent six years living in and reporting on China for NPR. China Road takes place at the end of his tenure, as he prepares to return to his homeland to take up a post as NPR's London correspondent.

Gifford embarks on a journey along China's Route 312, which he describes as China's Route 66, the main artery running from one end of the Middle Kingdom to the other. Linking the developing East to the struggling West, urban China to rural China, Han China to the minority "autonomous regions," Gifford depicts Route 312 as more than infrastructure connecting one place to another; Route 312 is an avenue of opportunity, a path to something better for many of China's "old hundred names."

He begins his trip in Shanghai and finishes at Korgaz, along the border with Kazakhstan (grrreat success!). Along the way, he shares his encounters with a variety of Chinese common people, from optimistic entrepreneurs, to poor farmers, to conflicted Uighurs, and paints a vivid picture of the diverse Chinese landscape, all in an effort to present the many opportunities, contradictions, and challenges that define modern China.

In depicting the present, Gifford incorporates excellent historical context and thoughtful analysis of the many issues confronting rising China as it marches towards the future. His insights and analysis are thought-provoking, and his writing style is most entertaining. It's a great read for any China buff.

I figured this was an appropriate topic if anything was

I'm surprised. Anyone else?

"N Korea closes more nuclear sites"