The U.S. used its post-WWII influence in East Asia to establish a series of bilateral alliances with key regional actors—Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Singapore, and the Philippines—in which it became the dominant partner at the center. This “hub-and-spokes” system reduced uncertainties within the structure as U.S. power became more predictable, and the U.S. position at the center meant that traditional enmities between countries such as Japan and South Korea were mitigated. It also ensured that Asian allies stayed well within the Western, anti-communist camp. Eventually, the security system evolved beyond a military focus to form a loosely-based political architecture that facilitated economic and political cooperation.
As a resident of Hong Kong, it has become abundantly clear to me that not everyone in East Asia is particularly fond of the American government. Still, the U.S. military preponderance of power and economic influence in the region generally seem to give it the political strength to pursue its own preferences despite what other governments might have in mind. When a government resists, as China's did yesterday, the act calls into question not only that specific country’s motives, but also forces one to take a step back and ask why the U.S. is still in the region in the first place. The Cold War is over, and unlike the Middle East, the U.S. is involved in no war there; moreover, it is highly improbably that the North Koreans will develop a missile that can carry the nuclear weapons they have been working on as far as Hawaii. In any case, why should America deal with North Korea, China or anyone else when responsible countries like Japan and South Korea are already in the neighborhood?
The most obvious answer is that the U.S. has the best political, economic, and military tools at its disposal to combat potential challenges. Still, this should not be understood to mean that other countries have inadequate resources, or that America need work with its Cold War allies in Tokyo, Taipei, or elsewhere to manage East Asian threats. A better question then might be why does the U.S. continue to value its relationship with East Asian security allies?
Although the political landscape has changed since the end of the Cold War, U.S. involvement with regional security partners persists because the “hub-and-spokes” alliance structure continues to provide tangible benefits for the U.S. Militarily, forward deployment of American forces at bases in these countries helps to decrease response times in addressing potential adversaries or nontraditional threats. Thus, Washington leaders hope to avert future “Pearl Harbors” and “September 11ths”. Ongoing participation also enhances the effectiveness of intelligence gathering and joint cooperation on projects such as national or theatre missile defense.
Economically, increasing trade and foreign direct investment make the region impossible to ignore, and regional allies can assist in protecting U.S. economic interests. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s website (TradeStats Express), the nation as a whole exported more goods to Japan (US$59 billion) and China (US$55 billion) than any other countries in 2006, excepting Canada and Mexico. Exports to Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Hong Kong (calculated separately from China), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations collectively increased 70.6 percent in six years (to US$262 billion) while imports from these countries grew 66.9 percent to US$646 billion. In order to protect future trade and investment, the U.S. relies on regional security allies to assist in the defense of sea lanes against piracy and other harmful influences externally, and pressures those countries internally to ensure U.S. companies receive fair or preferential treatment from within.
A third factor that pushes the U.S. to remain involved with its security allies in East Asia involves the importance of the interactions themselves. Over the past fifty years, the U.S. has developed constructive and mutually beneficial relationships with its regional allies that transcend security issues. In a book by G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, The Uses of Institutions: The U.S., Japan, and Governance in East Asia, the two argue that what was originally intended primarily as a security arrangement evolved into a series of economic and political arrangements. For example, with regard to Japan, “Free trade helped cement the alliance, and in turn the alliance helped settle economic disputes” (8). Consequently, U.S. economic and security involvement in the region has become mutually reinforcing. This has led to popular American support for security allies like Taiwan (vis-à-vis China) and South Korea (vis-à-vis the North).
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, U.S. political dominance within a group of economically and militarily powerful countries means that any rising power will find it much easier to accept U.S. leadership rather than oppose it. In the long run, this ensures U.S. priorities stay at the forefront of the international community’s regional agenda. It also means that rising countries such as China will “buy-in” to the U.S.-dominated international structure as they become more economically and politically integrated into the international community. Respect for peace, human rights, and economic cooperation (meaning the reduction of tariffs, adherence to intellectual property rights, etc.) are all important guidelines for integration. Adhering to these principles guarantees that U.S. products and perspectives will be given preference or at least fair treatment abroad. In the end, a U.S.-dominated regional structure does not necessarily prevent the rise of a future great power, but it does make the likelihood that such a country will offset U.S. hegemony much lower. Additionally, it means that China will find it much more difficult politically when it attempts to resist.
Written by Dan (East Asia Focus)
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