Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) President Chen Shui-bian has been pressing for Taiwan’s admittance into the United Nations (UN) under the name "Taiwan" rather than the government's official title of the Republic of China. UN Membership has become a highly charged political issue in Taiwan’s upcoming 2008 presidential election and has culminated in both the DPP and its main competitor the Nationalist Party (KMT) proposing a referendum that would ask the general public to vote on Taiwan’s inclusion. The KMT proposition, however, is fundamentally different in that it avoids the controversial renaming and the stringent time line of the DPP proposal. China, which regards Taiwan as a renegade province, opposes the island’s membership as a separate government and views a referendum vote tantamount to a vote for independence.
Recent news like yesterday’s Associated Press article demonstrates how ideological cross-strait issues have more tangible societal repercussions. As China grows, its relative influence strengthens and Taiwan’s international position weakens. With regard to membership in the UN this means that as time passes, Taiwan has a lower probability of actually being admitted. Accepting this fact, some might conclude that Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian has been increasingly pressing for membership because he anticipates China’s rise and would like Taiwan to join the UN before the island’s influence further declines.
A more likely scenario is that membership in the UN is less an ends in itself than a means to achieve an ends. This is to say Taiwan’s government in Taipei petitions the UN for membership, and encourages participation in the international community more generally, in order to reaffirm Taiwan’s de facto independence from the mainland. Although the petition itself is expected to fail, the process highlights real differences between the two sides. This argument was first articulated by Elizabeth Larus in an Issues & Studies article entitled, “Taiwan’s Quest for International Recognition.” According to Larus, Taiwan’s leaders use soft power to legitimize the regime as a separate country internationally. But if this is true, has the strategy been effective?
In recent years, President Chen’s efforts have continually frustrated and provoked China. The Chinese government in Beijing, which opposes official Taiwanese independence, has pursued a number of strategies to combat Chen’s official moves towards independence. Public condemnations and threats exemplified in Beijing’s Anti-Secession Law (反分裂法) have combined with attempts to co-opt local Taiwanese business in opposing legislation like the current referendum. China has also sought to engage the U.S.
In contrast, U.S. diplomacy attempts to manage the impasse by supporting measures that “maintain the status quo”. As Taiwan’s primary supporter for de facto independence, Washington understands the potential for war with China if Taipei is considered by Beijing to have declared independence. Consequently U.S. policymaking seeks to prevent either side from taking actions that would “unilaterally change” the current situation. It is, however, noteworthy that current situation changes constantly. In particular, China continues to deploy ballistic missiles across the Taiwan Strait and enhance its naval capabilities; meanwhile, Taiwan’s president pursues political agendas that seem to suggest he would like to establish a de jure independent country.
As it currently stands, President Chen’s efforts have succeeded magnificently in obtaining at least tacit international understanding that Taiwan is de facto independent from China, but have failed miserably in actually changing Taiwan’s legal definition (i.e. gaining widespread international recognition of de jure independence). Additionally, his policies dramatically polarized the issue of independence along party lines (with the KMT in opposition), marginalizing more moderate views. This may ultimately mean a DPP loss in the 2008 presidential race, although long-term effects are much harder to predict. In the interim, the U.S. and China wait for the next Taiwanese president to take office, hoping that he will be much more cooperative than his predecessor.
Written by Dan (East Asia Focus)
1 comment:
Great post Dan. I think this does a great job of presenting a major dynamic in the China-U.S.-Taiwan triangle.
I like your/Larus's idea that Taiwan's almost annual bid for the UN is more than anything, a forum for expressing Taiwan's de facto independence from China on the international stage (if I read that correctly). Indeed, in my mind, we're well past any point at which Taipei can preempt Beijing from achieving relative dominance in terms of international influence. We passed that point a long time ago. I feel as though Taiwan's international politcal relevance slips further everyday.
Chen's controversial iniative is more aimed at the domestic political audience than anywhere else I think. His motivation lies primarily in attempting to salvage his and his party's power for the near term than to secure de jure independence for Taiwan in the long term.
I think you're also right to point out that the situation over Taiwan is changing constantly. Washington plays a major role in this, diminishing the implications of any of Chen's contentious moves, and thus clouding the situation across the Strait with ambiguity whenever trouble arises.
This is unlikely to change any time soon. Beijing's comparative influence internationally, cemented by Washington's commitment to "one China" ambiguity, will continue to render Taipei more and more politically obsolete internationally. Couple these factors with the mainland's economic sway with the Taiwanese constituency, and China stands comfortably and confidently in control of the situation.
The U.S. only further relaxes Beijing these days by downplaying the significance of any political bravado and bluster from the island. These factors suggest I think, as Taiwanese "provocations" continue, and continue without any real consequence, that Beijing's "red line" will continue to slip back.
Barring any events that compromise the CCP's political legitimacy on the mainland, the "hot spot" over the Taiwan Strait will remain luke warm at most.
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