Cold War Institutions of Necessity in Contemporary East Asia: The U.S. “Hub-and-Spokes” Structure

This article was originally posted HERE.

The U.S. used its post-WWII influence in East Asia to establish a series of bilateral alliances with key regional actors—Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Singapore, and the Philippines—in which it became the dominant partner at the center. This “hub-and-spokes” system reduced uncertainties within the structure as U.S. power became more predictable, and the U.S. position at the center meant that traditional enmities between countries such as Japan and South Korea were mitigated. It also ensured that Asian allies stayed well within the Western, anti-communist camp. Eventually, the security system evolved beyond a military focus to form a loosely-based political architecture that facilitated economic and political cooperation.

As a resident of Hong Kong, it has become abundantly clear to me that not everyone in East Asia is particularly fond of the American government. Still, the U.S. military preponderance of power and economic influence in the region generally seem to give it the political strength to pursue its own preferences despite what other governments might have in mind. When a government resists, as China's did yesterday, the act calls into question not only that specific country’s motives, but also forces one to take a step back and ask why the U.S. is still in the region in the first place. The Cold War is over, and unlike the Middle East, the U.S. is involved in no war there; moreover, it is highly improbably that the North Koreans will develop a missile that can carry the nuclear weapons they have been working on as far as Hawaii. In any case, why should America deal with North Korea, China or anyone else when responsible countries like Japan and South Korea are already in the neighborhood?

The most obvious answer is that the U.S. has the best political, economic, and military tools at its disposal to combat potential challenges. Still, this should not be understood to mean that other countries have inadequate resources, or that America need work with its Cold War allies in Tokyo, Taipei, or elsewhere to manage East Asian threats. A better question then might be why does the U.S. continue to value its relationship with East Asian security allies?

Although the political landscape has changed since the end of the Cold War, U.S. involvement with regional security partners persists because the “hub-and-spokes” alliance structure continues to provide tangible benefits for the U.S. Militarily, forward deployment of American forces at bases in these countries helps to decrease response times in addressing potential adversaries or nontraditional threats. Thus, Washington leaders hope to avert future “Pearl Harbors” and “September 11ths”. Ongoing participation also enhances the effectiveness of intelligence gathering and joint cooperation on projects such as national or theatre missile defense.

Economically, increasing trade and foreign direct investment make the region impossible to ignore, and regional allies can assist in protecting U.S. economic interests. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s website (TradeStats Express), the nation as a whole exported more goods to Japan (US$59 billion) and China (US$55 billion) than any other countries in 2006, excepting Canada and Mexico. Exports to Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Hong Kong (calculated separately from China), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations collectively increased 70.6 percent in six years (to US$262 billion) while imports from these countries grew 66.9 percent to US$646 billion. In order to protect future trade and investment, the U.S. relies on regional security allies to assist in the defense of sea lanes against piracy and other harmful influences externally, and pressures those countries internally to ensure U.S. companies receive fair or preferential treatment from within.

A third factor that pushes the U.S. to remain involved with its security allies in East Asia involves the importance of the interactions themselves. Over the past fifty years, the U.S. has developed constructive and mutually beneficial relationships with its regional allies that transcend security issues. In a book by G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, The Uses of Institutions: The U.S., Japan, and Governance in East Asia, the two argue that what was originally intended primarily as a security arrangement evolved into a series of economic and political arrangements. For example, with regard to Japan, “Free trade helped cement the alliance, and in turn the alliance helped settle economic disputes” (8). Consequently, U.S. economic and security involvement in the region has become mutually reinforcing. This has led to popular American support for security allies like Taiwan (vis-à-vis China) and South Korea (vis-à-vis the North).

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, U.S. political dominance within a group of economically and militarily powerful countries means that any rising power will find it much easier to accept U.S. leadership rather than oppose it. In the long run, this ensures U.S. priorities stay at the forefront of the international community’s regional agenda. It also means that rising countries such as China will “buy-in” to the U.S.-dominated international structure as they become more economically and politically integrated into the international community. Respect for peace, human rights, and economic cooperation (meaning the reduction of tariffs, adherence to intellectual property rights, etc.) are all important guidelines for integration. Adhering to these principles guarantees that U.S. products and perspectives will be given preference or at least fair treatment abroad. In the end, a U.S.-dominated regional structure does not necessarily prevent the rise of a future great power, but it does make the likelihood that such a country will offset U.S. hegemony much lower. Additionally, it means that China will find it much more difficult politically when it attempts to resist.

Written by Dan (East Asia Focus)

Taiwan’s Bid for the UN: Does Success Matter?

Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) President Chen Shui-bian has been pressing for Taiwan’s admittance into the United Nations (UN) under the name "Taiwan" rather than the government's official title of the Republic of China. UN Membership has become a highly charged political issue in Taiwan’s upcoming 2008 presidential election and has culminated in both the DPP and its main competitor the Nationalist Party (KMT) proposing a referendum that would ask the general public to vote on Taiwan’s inclusion. The KMT proposition, however, is fundamentally different in that it avoids the controversial renaming and the stringent time line of the DPP proposal. China, which regards Taiwan as a renegade province, opposes the island’s membership as a separate government and views a referendum vote tantamount to a vote for independence.

Recent news like yesterday’s Associated Press article demonstrates how ideological cross-strait issues have more tangible societal repercussions. As China grows, its relative influence strengthens and Taiwan’s international position weakens. With regard to membership in the UN this means that as time passes, Taiwan has a lower probability of actually being admitted. Accepting this fact, some might conclude that Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian has been increasingly pressing for membership because he anticipates China’s rise and would like Taiwan to join the UN before the island’s influence further declines.

A more likely scenario is that membership in the UN is less an ends in itself than a means to achieve an ends. This is to say Taiwan’s government in Taipei petitions the UN for membership, and encourages participation in the international community more generally, in order to reaffirm Taiwan’s de facto independence from the mainland. Although the petition itself is expected to fail, the process highlights real differences between the two sides. This argument was first articulated by Elizabeth Larus in an Issues & Studies article entitled, “Taiwan’s Quest for International Recognition.” According to Larus, Taiwan’s leaders use soft power to legitimize the regime as a separate country internationally. But if this is true, has the strategy been effective?

In recent years, President Chen’s efforts have continually frustrated and provoked China. The Chinese government in Beijing, which opposes official Taiwanese independence, has pursued a number of strategies to combat Chen’s official moves towards independence. Public condemnations and threats exemplified in Beijing’s Anti-Secession Law (反分裂法) have combined with attempts to co-opt local Taiwanese business in opposing legislation like the current referendum. China has also sought to engage the U.S.

In contrast, U.S. diplomacy attempts to manage the impasse by supporting measures that “maintain the status quo”. As Taiwan’s primary supporter for de facto independence, Washington understands the potential for war with China if Taipei is considered by Beijing to have declared independence. Consequently U.S. policymaking seeks to prevent either side from taking actions that would “unilaterally change” the current situation. It is, however, noteworthy that current situation changes constantly. In particular, China continues to deploy ballistic missiles across the Taiwan Strait and enhance its naval capabilities; meanwhile, Taiwan’s president pursues political agendas that seem to suggest he would like to establish a de jure independent country.

As it currently stands, President Chen’s efforts have succeeded magnificently in obtaining at least tacit international understanding that Taiwan is de facto independent from China, but have failed miserably in actually changing Taiwan’s legal definition (i.e. gaining widespread international recognition of de jure independence). Additionally, his policies dramatically polarized the issue of independence along party lines (with the KMT in opposition), marginalizing more moderate views. This may ultimately mean a DPP loss in the 2008 presidential race, although long-term effects are much harder to predict. In the interim, the U.S. and China wait for the next Taiwanese president to take office, hoping that he will be much more cooperative than his predecessor.

Written by Dan (East Asia Focus)

Burmese Demonstrations Undermine Regime Legitimacy

Burma has been in the news quite a bit lately regarding ongoing human rights issues and the recent suppression of demonstrations. I thought it would be pertinent to post some background about the recent issues for people that are lesser informed, but still very interested in the topic. The following is a brief summary of the issues as I understand them.

In 1988, Burma’s ruling party agreed to hold democratic elections in the country. At the time the party believed it would win the popular vote and an election would further legitimate its continued rule of the government. Unfortunately for the ruling party, however, it did not win and ultimately refused to turnover power. When widespread demonstrations erupted in protest to the government’s decision, the military stepped in and established a junta regime.

In theory the regime has been working towards political reforms that will eventual allow for democratic rule, but in practice real change has been slow. The justification used internationally for the military junta's rule is that the country currently has no constitutional mechanism that would allow for a democratically elected party to rule. Although this reason hypothetically accepts that Burma only requires the creation of constitution that would allow for democratic turnover, in actually the regime has at best dragged its feet on commitments to create such a document. In its current stage, the ruling party has been allegedly working with foreign leaders to establish a draft set of ‘guiding principles’ that will inform the process of drafting of a new constitution, but this process has yielded few substantive results.

To date, the military junta has continued to rule the country with mixed success. On the surface, the military has maintained control over both the country and the people even while real support for the regime seems to be eroding. Exemplifying the types of controls the government relies is the house arrest of democratic opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi since 1989. Additionally, the importance of the military to many families as a social network for securing necessary commodities such as rice and oil enhances the grip of the junta. In combination with political suppression and widespread poverty, citizens lack the political and economic capacity to mount an effective challenge to the regime (listen to an interview by an expert on Burma studies here).

Yet the core issues that legitimate the regime's monopoly of force appear to be eroding. Burma expert and Dean of Social Sciences, Professor Ian Holliday, explains that poor economic planning mixed with recent acts of repression, and violence against Buddhist monks in particular, fundamentally challenge the regime’s claim to legitimacy (listen here).

Whether this will ultimately challenge the junta’s grip on power remains to be seen. Currently, on the surface most things seemed to have calmed and it is “business as usual” in Burma. Still, there are reasons to suspect this is only superficial. Recent acts of political dissent by smaller groups appear to be growing. The posting of wall posters and other isolated acts of opposition (www.mizzima.com) have not led to a coordinated effort as occurred in 1988, but it does suggest something. It could be that restriction on internet use (as well as its sluggish pace) and other communication makes cooperation difficult. It may also be that for now the government is effective in its policing. Yet the regime may be giving ground.

According to a statement today (10 November) by the democratic opposition party, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi may be released soon (www.mizzima.com). This follows an agreement to allow a UN special envoy’s visit to Burma and an exchange between democratic opposition leader and the UN representative. It also follows an understanding made between the democratic leader and the junta regime to cooperate on dialogue.

It is possible that recent moves are only symbolic gestures by the military junta in Burma. Nevertheless, this appears to be more than has happened in the past. No doubt international pressures played a decisive role in this outcome. Whether real substantive political change will occur as a result remains to be seen.

Written by Dan (East Asia Focus)

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In early October I conducted an interview as part of a University of Hong Kong program ("Global Passport") with the Dean of Social Sciences at the university, Ian Holliday. Professor Holliday is an expert in Burma studies and you can listen to the interview online here.

You may also find helpful information regarding Burma news at www.mizzima.com.