Thursday, April 26, 2007

Update!

The inevitable rush of deadlines that accompanies the end of any semester is certainly taking its toll on all those involved or soon to be involved on the blog. Thus far, I've been getting some good feedback and with any luck, the participant pool will continue to expand in the coming weeks. As the semester winds to a close, the dialogue in the forum should take off.

I'm going to try to get things started with a brief post, and touch on one of a number of issues currently affecting Asia that I've wanted to talk about. As most are aware, a few weeks ago Premier Wen Jiabao visited Japan, marking the first time in nearly 7 years that a Chinese premier visited the country. The visit was remarkable for a number of reasons. Not only did it signify a fresh start and thawing of previously frosty Sino-Japan relations under Koizumi, but I think Wen's visit reflects a change of attitude in Beijing.

On his visit, Wen stressed a "win-win" relationship b/w the two powers, and made some unprecedented acknowledgements of Japan's contribution to China's modernization, Japan's value as an economic partner, and Japan's efforts to address its history and its past apologies for its transgressions against the Chinese and other peoples of Asia. Wen also acknowledged Japan's experiences as victim during the first half of the 20th century. Overall, Wen seemed to emphasize the two countries' promising future over their troubled past.

This strikes me as rather remarkable, though not completely unexpected. Typically, when looking at Chinese nationalism, one thinks of vehement anti-Japanese (and occasionally anti-West) sentiment based on a century of humiliation. China's present foreign policy is often thought to be driven in part by a quest for redemption and a restoration of dignity. Wen's visit suggests to me that perhaps this driver of China's foreign policy is losing ground to economic rationalism and pragmatism. China need not harp on the past anymore to "rally the troops"; its present and future are promising enough to inspire.

Whether this marks the beginning of a transformation of Chinese nationalism or simply a change in CCP policy is hard to determine. Certainly, Chinese nationalism, despite its utility as a political tool for the CCP, has often shown itself to operate outside the control of the government in Beijing. Drawing conclusions about an evolution in the Chinese national psyche based on government policy is tempting, but difficult to say the least.



Some question whether this warming of Sino-Japanese relations even marks a genuine evolution of CCP policy. Some speculate, as highlighted in this article from the Economist, that Beijing's charm offensive, "smile diplomacy," whatever you want to call it, is simply an insurance policy for the 2008 Olympics, a temporary initiative to ensure the successful execution of Beijing's coming out party. Visiting Japan in April (which is coincidentally the most popular month for official Yasakuni-visiting), and the statements and agreements that followed, might just aim to prevent any actions that would harm Sino-Japanese ties and to keep the Chinese population subdued.

I'm not convinced of this short-term argument. I think Beijing is realizing the long-term benefits of sustained healthy relations with all of its neighbors, even Japan. I also think that the impetus to continue to dwell on history is dwindling, as China's economic growth has really restored it to a high level of status in the international community. The pragmatism of the government, especially in an authoritarian state will trickle down to the masses. It would be hard to claim a transformation of nationalism, but I'm going to do it anyway.

If my hypothesis is correct, I think this invites a number of interesting questions for Asia buffs to toss around. First, what does this suggest about the evolution of a more functional Asian regional identity? I'd say to this point, competition b/w Japan and China (and to a lesser extent, Korea) have hindered regionalism's development in Asia. Could we see progress in this area following improve Sino-Japanese ties? Second, as for Korea, does Chinese nationalism's evolution reveal anything about the nature of Korean nationalism, (since one has enjoyed greatly improved relations with Japan, while the other has not)? Or does it just speak to differing political structures in the two countries? Also, what does it imply for the U.S. security posture in East Asia?

I guess this wasn't such a brief post after all, but I needed to make up for the last week or so of quiet. Stay tuned and feel free to post! This isn't just about East Asia either. Feel free to talk about anything on the continent. I think anything between Iran and Australia is fair game. Good luck with finals and projects!

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