Cold War Institutions of Necessity in Contemporary East Asia: The U.S. “Hub-and-Spokes” Structure

This article was originally posted HERE.

The U.S. used its post-WWII influence in East Asia to establish a series of bilateral alliances with key regional actors—Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Singapore, and the Philippines—in which it became the dominant partner at the center. This “hub-and-spokes” system reduced uncertainties within the structure as U.S. power became more predictable, and the U.S. position at the center meant that traditional enmities between countries such as Japan and South Korea were mitigated. It also ensured that Asian allies stayed well within the Western, anti-communist camp. Eventually, the security system evolved beyond a military focus to form a loosely-based political architecture that facilitated economic and political cooperation.

As a resident of Hong Kong, it has become abundantly clear to me that not everyone in East Asia is particularly fond of the American government. Still, the U.S. military preponderance of power and economic influence in the region generally seem to give it the political strength to pursue its own preferences despite what other governments might have in mind. When a government resists, as China's did yesterday, the act calls into question not only that specific country’s motives, but also forces one to take a step back and ask why the U.S. is still in the region in the first place. The Cold War is over, and unlike the Middle East, the U.S. is involved in no war there; moreover, it is highly improbably that the North Koreans will develop a missile that can carry the nuclear weapons they have been working on as far as Hawaii. In any case, why should America deal with North Korea, China or anyone else when responsible countries like Japan and South Korea are already in the neighborhood?

The most obvious answer is that the U.S. has the best political, economic, and military tools at its disposal to combat potential challenges. Still, this should not be understood to mean that other countries have inadequate resources, or that America need work with its Cold War allies in Tokyo, Taipei, or elsewhere to manage East Asian threats. A better question then might be why does the U.S. continue to value its relationship with East Asian security allies?

Although the political landscape has changed since the end of the Cold War, U.S. involvement with regional security partners persists because the “hub-and-spokes” alliance structure continues to provide tangible benefits for the U.S. Militarily, forward deployment of American forces at bases in these countries helps to decrease response times in addressing potential adversaries or nontraditional threats. Thus, Washington leaders hope to avert future “Pearl Harbors” and “September 11ths”. Ongoing participation also enhances the effectiveness of intelligence gathering and joint cooperation on projects such as national or theatre missile defense.

Economically, increasing trade and foreign direct investment make the region impossible to ignore, and regional allies can assist in protecting U.S. economic interests. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s website (TradeStats Express), the nation as a whole exported more goods to Japan (US$59 billion) and China (US$55 billion) than any other countries in 2006, excepting Canada and Mexico. Exports to Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Hong Kong (calculated separately from China), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations collectively increased 70.6 percent in six years (to US$262 billion) while imports from these countries grew 66.9 percent to US$646 billion. In order to protect future trade and investment, the U.S. relies on regional security allies to assist in the defense of sea lanes against piracy and other harmful influences externally, and pressures those countries internally to ensure U.S. companies receive fair or preferential treatment from within.

A third factor that pushes the U.S. to remain involved with its security allies in East Asia involves the importance of the interactions themselves. Over the past fifty years, the U.S. has developed constructive and mutually beneficial relationships with its regional allies that transcend security issues. In a book by G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, The Uses of Institutions: The U.S., Japan, and Governance in East Asia, the two argue that what was originally intended primarily as a security arrangement evolved into a series of economic and political arrangements. For example, with regard to Japan, “Free trade helped cement the alliance, and in turn the alliance helped settle economic disputes” (8). Consequently, U.S. economic and security involvement in the region has become mutually reinforcing. This has led to popular American support for security allies like Taiwan (vis-à-vis China) and South Korea (vis-à-vis the North).

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, U.S. political dominance within a group of economically and militarily powerful countries means that any rising power will find it much easier to accept U.S. leadership rather than oppose it. In the long run, this ensures U.S. priorities stay at the forefront of the international community’s regional agenda. It also means that rising countries such as China will “buy-in” to the U.S.-dominated international structure as they become more economically and politically integrated into the international community. Respect for peace, human rights, and economic cooperation (meaning the reduction of tariffs, adherence to intellectual property rights, etc.) are all important guidelines for integration. Adhering to these principles guarantees that U.S. products and perspectives will be given preference or at least fair treatment abroad. In the end, a U.S.-dominated regional structure does not necessarily prevent the rise of a future great power, but it does make the likelihood that such a country will offset U.S. hegemony much lower. Additionally, it means that China will find it much more difficult politically when it attempts to resist.

Written by Dan (East Asia Focus)

Taiwan’s Bid for the UN: Does Success Matter?

Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) President Chen Shui-bian has been pressing for Taiwan’s admittance into the United Nations (UN) under the name "Taiwan" rather than the government's official title of the Republic of China. UN Membership has become a highly charged political issue in Taiwan’s upcoming 2008 presidential election and has culminated in both the DPP and its main competitor the Nationalist Party (KMT) proposing a referendum that would ask the general public to vote on Taiwan’s inclusion. The KMT proposition, however, is fundamentally different in that it avoids the controversial renaming and the stringent time line of the DPP proposal. China, which regards Taiwan as a renegade province, opposes the island’s membership as a separate government and views a referendum vote tantamount to a vote for independence.

Recent news like yesterday’s Associated Press article demonstrates how ideological cross-strait issues have more tangible societal repercussions. As China grows, its relative influence strengthens and Taiwan’s international position weakens. With regard to membership in the UN this means that as time passes, Taiwan has a lower probability of actually being admitted. Accepting this fact, some might conclude that Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian has been increasingly pressing for membership because he anticipates China’s rise and would like Taiwan to join the UN before the island’s influence further declines.

A more likely scenario is that membership in the UN is less an ends in itself than a means to achieve an ends. This is to say Taiwan’s government in Taipei petitions the UN for membership, and encourages participation in the international community more generally, in order to reaffirm Taiwan’s de facto independence from the mainland. Although the petition itself is expected to fail, the process highlights real differences between the two sides. This argument was first articulated by Elizabeth Larus in an Issues & Studies article entitled, “Taiwan’s Quest for International Recognition.” According to Larus, Taiwan’s leaders use soft power to legitimize the regime as a separate country internationally. But if this is true, has the strategy been effective?

In recent years, President Chen’s efforts have continually frustrated and provoked China. The Chinese government in Beijing, which opposes official Taiwanese independence, has pursued a number of strategies to combat Chen’s official moves towards independence. Public condemnations and threats exemplified in Beijing’s Anti-Secession Law (反分裂法) have combined with attempts to co-opt local Taiwanese business in opposing legislation like the current referendum. China has also sought to engage the U.S.

In contrast, U.S. diplomacy attempts to manage the impasse by supporting measures that “maintain the status quo”. As Taiwan’s primary supporter for de facto independence, Washington understands the potential for war with China if Taipei is considered by Beijing to have declared independence. Consequently U.S. policymaking seeks to prevent either side from taking actions that would “unilaterally change” the current situation. It is, however, noteworthy that current situation changes constantly. In particular, China continues to deploy ballistic missiles across the Taiwan Strait and enhance its naval capabilities; meanwhile, Taiwan’s president pursues political agendas that seem to suggest he would like to establish a de jure independent country.

As it currently stands, President Chen’s efforts have succeeded magnificently in obtaining at least tacit international understanding that Taiwan is de facto independent from China, but have failed miserably in actually changing Taiwan’s legal definition (i.e. gaining widespread international recognition of de jure independence). Additionally, his policies dramatically polarized the issue of independence along party lines (with the KMT in opposition), marginalizing more moderate views. This may ultimately mean a DPP loss in the 2008 presidential race, although long-term effects are much harder to predict. In the interim, the U.S. and China wait for the next Taiwanese president to take office, hoping that he will be much more cooperative than his predecessor.

Written by Dan (East Asia Focus)

Burmese Demonstrations Undermine Regime Legitimacy

Burma has been in the news quite a bit lately regarding ongoing human rights issues and the recent suppression of demonstrations. I thought it would be pertinent to post some background about the recent issues for people that are lesser informed, but still very interested in the topic. The following is a brief summary of the issues as I understand them.

In 1988, Burma’s ruling party agreed to hold democratic elections in the country. At the time the party believed it would win the popular vote and an election would further legitimate its continued rule of the government. Unfortunately for the ruling party, however, it did not win and ultimately refused to turnover power. When widespread demonstrations erupted in protest to the government’s decision, the military stepped in and established a junta regime.

In theory the regime has been working towards political reforms that will eventual allow for democratic rule, but in practice real change has been slow. The justification used internationally for the military junta's rule is that the country currently has no constitutional mechanism that would allow for a democratically elected party to rule. Although this reason hypothetically accepts that Burma only requires the creation of constitution that would allow for democratic turnover, in actually the regime has at best dragged its feet on commitments to create such a document. In its current stage, the ruling party has been allegedly working with foreign leaders to establish a draft set of ‘guiding principles’ that will inform the process of drafting of a new constitution, but this process has yielded few substantive results.

To date, the military junta has continued to rule the country with mixed success. On the surface, the military has maintained control over both the country and the people even while real support for the regime seems to be eroding. Exemplifying the types of controls the government relies is the house arrest of democratic opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi since 1989. Additionally, the importance of the military to many families as a social network for securing necessary commodities such as rice and oil enhances the grip of the junta. In combination with political suppression and widespread poverty, citizens lack the political and economic capacity to mount an effective challenge to the regime (listen to an interview by an expert on Burma studies here).

Yet the core issues that legitimate the regime's monopoly of force appear to be eroding. Burma expert and Dean of Social Sciences, Professor Ian Holliday, explains that poor economic planning mixed with recent acts of repression, and violence against Buddhist monks in particular, fundamentally challenge the regime’s claim to legitimacy (listen here).

Whether this will ultimately challenge the junta’s grip on power remains to be seen. Currently, on the surface most things seemed to have calmed and it is “business as usual” in Burma. Still, there are reasons to suspect this is only superficial. Recent acts of political dissent by smaller groups appear to be growing. The posting of wall posters and other isolated acts of opposition (www.mizzima.com) have not led to a coordinated effort as occurred in 1988, but it does suggest something. It could be that restriction on internet use (as well as its sluggish pace) and other communication makes cooperation difficult. It may also be that for now the government is effective in its policing. Yet the regime may be giving ground.

According to a statement today (10 November) by the democratic opposition party, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi may be released soon (www.mizzima.com). This follows an agreement to allow a UN special envoy’s visit to Burma and an exchange between democratic opposition leader and the UN representative. It also follows an understanding made between the democratic leader and the junta regime to cooperate on dialogue.

It is possible that recent moves are only symbolic gestures by the military junta in Burma. Nevertheless, this appears to be more than has happened in the past. No doubt international pressures played a decisive role in this outcome. Whether real substantive political change will occur as a result remains to be seen.

Written by Dan (East Asia Focus)

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In early October I conducted an interview as part of a University of Hong Kong program ("Global Passport") with the Dean of Social Sciences at the university, Ian Holliday. Professor Holliday is an expert in Burma studies and you can listen to the interview online here.

You may also find helpful information regarding Burma news at www.mizzima.com.

Water Pollution in China

Following up on the green GDP post from a few weeks ago, a few recent articles highlight both the severity of China's environmental problems, and the government's growing efforts to address those woes. Despite the indefinite suspension of the 2005 green GDP this past July, it appears that Chinese officials are not deviating from their broader mission to tackle pollution and the serious health risks it presents.

Chinese state media reported this week that water pollution in China currently threatens the health and safety of one sixth of the population (see Reuters article). River water in many parts of China is unfit to touch, let alone drink. This not only directly threatens the diets and health of many Chinese but also compromises the food supply in how it affects the fish population and the irrigation of crops. Such water conditions become especially dire when considering that many parts of China suffer from a shortage of water to begin with.


Rapid economic development, corruption, poor pollution laws, and lax enforcement of those laws, all have contributed to the current state of the environment in China today. Water pollution is a major component of that. For example, a state study of Zhukou city in Henan province found that 15 of 23 factories were illegally dumping waste into the water supply (see Reuters article). Part of the problem is factory owners neglecting pollution regulations and local officials turning a blind eye, but another part of the problem is insufficient restrictions and weak enforcement mechanisms for violators. Chairman of the National People's Congress's (NPC) Environment and Resource Protection Committee, Mao Rubai, recently remarked that pollution standards for some industries are too low to make a dent in China's battle against environmental degradation (see Reuters article).

Over the weekend, officials (from SEPA, I believe) made a step to change this sour state of affairs. They put forward a draft amendment to the Standing Committee of the NPC to amend the water pollution prevention and control law to incorporate harsher penalties for pollution violators and better monitor and enforce pollution regulations. Major clauses of the bill include:

• Lifting the existing pollution penalty cap of 1 million RMB and replacing it with 20% to 30% of the cost of the pollution


• People responsible for major accidents will be susceptible to prosecution


• Introducing a licensing system for emitters of waste water containing toxic or radioactive materials; No license, no pollution


• Placing extra emphasis on protecting drinking water sources


• Strengthening emergency response system for water pollution accidents (see article)

The proposed amendment comes just weeks after SEPA announced that 30 firms would be blacklisted for gross pollution violations, barring them from receiving bank loans (see BBC article).

A change in political culture appears poised to accompany this apparent legal offensive against illegal polluters, a logical compliment considering how lax or corrupt political enforcement at the local level enables industrial polluters. Ma Kai, chief of the National Resource and Development Commission (NRDC), recently revealed that "meeting energy and pollution reduction targets would be made a major factor in considering promotions for provincial-level officials," (see Reuters article).

While these steps strike me as the right way to approach the issue, it remains to be seen if they will produce results. China's struggle against environmental pollution in recent years has been little more than just that - a struggle. The country failed to reach the 2006 benchmarks for pollution reduction and energy consumption per unit GDP as put forth in the most recent five-year plan (see IHT article), (Beijing's 11th Five Year Plan aims to reduce energy consumption per unit GDP by 20% between 2006 and 2010 and lower major pollution output by 10% in that same period). In fact, pollution...at least water pollution...was on the rise in 2006, with the chemical oxygen demand, a water pollution index, rising by 0.24% in 2006.

It is hard for me to gauge to what extent national laws, blacklists, and the prospect of political promotion have played a role, or failed to play a role, in the counter-pollution effort. Thus, it is even harder to gauge how those factors will play a role in turning the tide in the fight against pollution. On paper, it certainly helps to redefine regulation and introduce political penalties to local officials, in addition to fiscal and legal consequences for polluters. In reality however, the prevalence of lower-level government corruption, the dominance of a profit-first economic culture, and obvious institutional deficiencies in the anti-pollution regime, suggest that these measures may not be as impactful as they should be. Perhaps, as Hu Jintao consolidates his power, and the anti-corruption, anti-pollution, pro-harmony generation leaves its mark on China's future development, these obstacles will erode away. Until then, China has a lot more to clean up than just river beds.

Japan, ASEAN Reach Free Trade Agreement

Japan and ASEAN have agreed in principle to the establishment of a free trade zone between the two parties. Representatives from both sides came to a consensus on an outline for the agreement at a three-day ASEAN economic conference in Manila. The deal is expected to be finalized at the upcoming ASEAN summit meeting this November (Voice of America).

The FTA with Japan is one of many on ASEAN's plate at the moment. It is currently also pursuing FTAs with China, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand, and is exploring the potential for an FTA with Pakistan (Forbes). The FTA with China, like the one with Japan, is expected to be completed by the end of this year. The other agreements are all in more preliminary phases. ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong expects that all five agreements (excl. Pakistan) will be completed by 2013 (Forbes).

ASEAN's FTA offensive is part of a broader ASEAN strategy to build an Asian Economic Community (AEC) by 2015, a strong Southeast Asian economic bloc capable of running with economic giants like China and India into the 21st century (Voice of America). As Asia continues to grow economically and China and India continue to acquire political influence, ASEAN continues to look for ways to compete economically and remain relevant. By casting a wide net into regional trade waters, ASEAN diversifies its economic portfolio and expands its prospects for growth. It also helps balance external political influence on the Southeast Asian bloc.

The ASEAN-Japan FTA is the latest step in this process. The agreement hopes to expand on already strong trade and investment relationships with Japan. Japan accounted for 12% of ASEAN's trade in 2006 (BBC News), and as of around 2003-2004, unless I am mistaken, Japan was ASEAN's largest source of investment (Lincoln, East Asian Economic Regionalism). The agreement also helps ASEAN balance the influence of China.

For Japan, free trade agreements with Southeast Asia have become common practice. It has already concluded 6 bilateral FTAs with Southeast Asian states, including one just last week with Indonesia (The Economic Intelligence Unit Briefing). Expanding economic relations with the region provides Japan with access to energy resources - the deal with Indonesia, for example, features a comprehensive resource acquisition/investment agreement. It also allows Japan to diversify away from its economic reliance on the United States, and balance against the regional influence of China. This multilateral agreement with ASEAN compliments the previous bilateral trade pacts and contributes to all three of Japan's regional goals.

Analysts are skeptical however that this FTA, or any other regional FTA on ASEAN's plate, can yield concrete results. Southeast Asia lacks infrastructure and suffers from poor product standards that contribute to an overall unappealing climate for foreign investment (Voice of America). Furthermore, the ever-present issue of agricultural in Asia-based trade deals means that any substantive gains from an FTA could be years, if not decades, away.

Personally, I will be greatly surprised if these FTAs can actually materialize into an Asian economic bloc, as ASEAN seems to be envisioning with the AEC. The economic obstacles, political obstacles and competing interests in the region seem too great to overcome in just a decade. Nonetheless, last week's economic conference marked an important step in the right direction, and I suppose November's summit meeting will yield more clues as to the fate of the would-be Asian economic bloc. Keep an eye out.

The Problems with Beijing's Involvement in Chinese Energy Investments

Sorry for the China-heavy contributions. I do have other interests, I promise. This policy brief from the Brookings Institute, "Untangling China's Quest for Oil through State-backed Financials Deals," deals with one of my primary interests though, and I thought anyone else interested in China's energy security strategy would want to give it a read.

The Brookings brief looks more closely at the impact of China's state-financing and foreign aid practices in its energy policy, and suggests that if Beijing's practices do not change, and China remains on the outside looking in at international finance/investment regimes, the heavy state involvement in energy investment deals could eventually undermine open, competitive international energy markets, and in turn international energy security, as well as international aid.

The brief concludes that China should be incorporated into more international forums that can regulate financial interactions and energy practices, like the IEA and the OECD Export Credit Arrangement. These groupings will not only hold China to legal standards and test Beijing's merit as a "responsible stakeholder" in the international system, but also expand dialogue and build trust among parties so that Beijing does not feel compelled to continue financial practices that can undermine competitive international energy markets or international aid.

For more on this subject, I suggest this NBR study from 2006, and this 2006 Brookings report on China's Energy Security Strategy.

These reports all discuss the implications of China's energy policy for the United States, but I'd be curious to hear if anyone has any insights, ideas, or links that deal with how other actors (India, Northeast Asian states, etc.) view China's energy policy and practices.

Red Light for China's Green GDP Report

Last month, Beijing announced that it was indefinitely suspending the release of its 2005 "green GDP" report, a study designed to calculate the environmental costs of China's economic development. The announcement has generated considerable speculation and reveals much about both the growing burden of China's environmental woes on the decision-makers in Beijing, and the complexities of Chinese domestic politics.

Originally scheduled for release in March, 2007 (Reuters), the officially titled Environmentally Adjusted GDP Accounting Report for 2005 was slated to be the more thorough, more detailed follow-up to a 2004 report of the same nature, and a major notch in the belt of China's emerging environmental policy.

Growing social unrest over horrendous and harmful environmental problems at home, as well as the increased international consciousness of global climate change, have elevated environmentalism to a political priority in China. Last fall, the National People's Congress set forth ambitious goals to improve energy efficiency, reduce consumption, and fight pollution (China Brief, Vol. VII, Issue 16). From my own observations, since that time, China has also begun listing environmental concerns and global warming among its common interests with regional neighbors and international powers. Calculating "green GDP" is part of a broad approach that attempts to inject a sense of environmental responsibility into China's economically-minded, "development first" political culture.

China launched its "green GDP" project in 2003-2004, jointly administered by the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The first product of the endeavor, the 2004 report, was released in 2006. Assessing the scale of environmental pollution in 10 provinces, the report found that pollution cost China over $67 billion US dollars, 3 percent of its GDP, in 2004 (Worldwatch).

The 2005 report was national in scope, and measured the country's "green GDP" according to seven different criteria, including environmental pollution. The other criteria included depletion costs of mines, forests, land, water, and wildlife, as well as costs to the ecosystem (China Brief). The 2005 report also provides a provincial breakdown in each category, creating a "green GDP" report at the provincial as well as national level.

Obviously, given the increased scope of the study and the expanded criteria, not to mention China's continued struggle to rein in its energy appetite, the 2005 report promised to deliver more disturbing statistics than its predecessor. This alone would be enough to make already-antsy officials in Beijing reluctant to release the results of the report for fear of generating further social unrest, especially with the 17th Party Congress around the corner in the fall. Furthermore, the localization of blame (at the provincial level) for the country's environmental problems introduces additional opponents to the report into the picture (provincial and local officials). According to Wenran Jiang, in some provinces, the cost of pollution, resource depletion, and damage to the ecosystem would actually cancel out the economic gains of the province's GDP for the year (China Brief).

Chinese officials appear divided over the report and divisions, at least publicly, seem to adhere to the old adage about Chinese politics, "Where you sit is where you stand." Officials with the NBS claim that the report's release has been indefinitely suspended due to conflicts over the scientific accuracy of the statistics and technical issues pertaining to publication (Worldwatch). Indeed this is true. As NBS Chief Xie Fuzhan (pictured left) recently told reporters, China is essentially pioneering the creation of a "green GDP" index and the use of "green GDP" to measure and confront environmental degradation (Asia Times). No international standards exist for such a project. According to the 2003 UN Handbook on National Accounting, "there is no consensus on how 'green GDP' can be calculated and, in fact, still less consensus on whether it should be attempted at all." How to quantify environmental elements in terms of monetary value remains an extremely challenging and uncertain task. (Note: this article from Resources for the Future attempts to bridge the gap between environmentalism and economics)

Officials in SEPA meanwhile, and other environmental agencies, remain more loyal to the cause of 'green GDP' and are more candid when discussing the motivations behind suspending the report's release. Wang Jinnan from the Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning (CAEP) recently revealed, "There exist major differences between the environmental-protection agency and the statistical bureau regarding the content of the report and its distribution," (Asia Times). As he told Beijing News:

"In the current sensitive climate where everybody is talking about 'green change,' some provinces fear publicizing their revised [green] GDP figures...Some local governments have lobbied us and tried to put pressure on us not to make the report public."

SEPA, CAEP, and Chinese environmentalists support the report's release, despite technical difficulties and political opposition. The NBS sees things differently. This gap in perspective has put the 2005 report on the shelf until further notice.

But while the 2005 report may not be made public, the importance of addressing China's worsening environmental woes will not fade away so easily for the Chinese government or the Chinese people. China is, and will continue to be, one of the most polluted countries in the world until it takes some drastic steps to address its pollution problems and curb its consumption of energy and natural resources. The launching of the "green GDP" project a few years ago seemed like a new and exciting step in the right direction: an active, ambitious, and creative approach to a demanding challenge. The tie-up over the 2005 "green GDP" report suggests that the more things change, the more they stay the same. In China, "face" and positive financial statistics remain more important than results.

On a positive note however, the concept of "green GDP" is not dead, nor is environmentalism in China. The 2006 report, perhaps in hopes that it will yield more positive results, and perhaps because its release will not precede any high profile political conferences, is still going ahead as planned (China Daily). Outside observers may be helpless to remove political obstacles to the development of China's "green GDP," but international actors and non-government actors can still play a major role in tackling the technical challenges of the index, and more importantly the environmental problems the index aims to address.